Criticality and finite size effects in a simple realistic model of stock
  market by Challet, Damien & Marsili, Matteo
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
21
05
49
v2
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  4
 D
ec
 20
02
Criticality and finite size effects in a simple realistic model of stock market
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We discuss a simple model based on the Minority Game which reproduces the main stylized facts of
anomalous fluctuations in finance. We present the analytic solution of the model in the thermody-
namic limit and show that stylized facts arise only close to a line of critical points with non-trivial
properties. By a simple argument, we show that, in Minority Games, the emergence of critical
fluctuations close to the phase transition is governed by the interplay between the signal to noise
ratio and the system size. These results provide a clear and consistent picture of financial markets
as critical systems.
Understanding the origin of the anomalous collective
fluctuations arising in stock markets poses novel and fas-
cinating challenges in statistical physics. Stock market
prices are characterized by anomalous collective fluctua-
tions – known as stylized facts [1] – which are strongly
reminiscent of critical phenomena: Prices do not follow a
simple random walk process, but rather price increments
are fat tailed distributed and their absolute value exhibits
long range auto-correlations, called volatility clustering.
The connection with critical phenomena is natural, be-
cause financial markets are indeed complex systems of
many interacting degrees of freedom — the traders. By
means of agent based modeling, it has been realized [2–6]
that stylized facts are due to the way in which the trad-
ing activity of agents interacting in a market “dresses”
the fluctuations arising from economic activity – the so-
called fundamentals. Ref. [6] has shown that very simple
models based on the Minority Game [7] can reproduce a
quite realistic and rich behavior. Their simplicity makes
an analytical approach to these models possible, using
tools of statistical physics. Whether Minority Games de-
scribe interacting traders is a matter of debate [8,10].
At any rate, the emergence of anomalous fluctuations in
these models, besides providing a scenario for the behav-
ior of real markets, poses questions in statistical physics
which deserve interest of their own.
In this Letter, we first introduce the simplest possible
Grand Canonical Minority Game (GCMG) which repro-
duces the main stylized facts, i.e. fat tails and volatility
clustering. Then we present the analytic solution of this
model in the relevant thermodynamic limit. It shows
that the behavior of GCMG, in this limit, exhibits Gaus-
sian fluctuation for all parameter values but on a line of
critical points which marks a discontinuous phase tran-
sition. For finite size systems, numerical simulations re-
veal that stylized facts emerge close to the transition line,
but they abruptly disappear as the system size increases.
Remarkably, the vanishing of stylized facts when the sys-
tem’s size increases also occurs in a variety of models of
financial markets [11]. We present a theory of finite size
effects which is fully confirmed by numerical simulations.
This allows us to conclude that anomalous fluctuations
are properties of the critical point in GCMG. The phase
transition is quite unique as it mixes features which are
typical of first order phase transitions – as discontinuities
and phase coexistence – and of second order phase tran-
sitions – such as the divergence of correlation volumes
and finite size effects.
In the market described by the Minority Game [7],
agents i = 1, · · · , N submit a bid bi(t) to the market in
every period t = 1, 2, . . .. Agents whose bid has the op-
posite sign of the total bid A(t) =
∑
i bi(t), win whereas
the others lose. The bids of agents depend on the value
µ(t) of a public information variable, which is drawn uni-
formly from the integers 1, . . . , P . In other words, agents
have trading strategies which prescribes to agent i a bid
aµi ± 1 for each information µ. Each agent is assigned
one such strategy, randomly chosen from the set of 2P
possible strategies of this type. Agents are adaptive and
may decide to refrain from playing if their strategy is not
good enough [3,4]. More precisely, the bids of agents take
the form bi(t) = φi(t)a
µ(t)
i where φi(t) = 1 or 0 according
to whether agent i trades or not. In order to assess the
performance of their strategy, agents assign scores Ui(t)
which they update by
Ui(t+ 1) = Ui(t)− aµ(t)i A(t)− ǫi. (1)
where
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
bi(t) =
N∑
i=1
φi(t)a
µ(t)
i . (2)
So if −aµ(t)i A(t) is large enough, i.e., larger than ǫi, the
score Ui increases. The larger Ui, the more likely it is that
the agent trades (φi = 1). Here we suppose that [12]
Prob{φi(t) = 1} = 1
1 + eΓUi(t)
(3)
where Γ > 0 is a constant. A good strategy pre-
scribes bids aµi which tend to coincide with those b(t) =
−signA(t) of the minority of agents. The connection
with markets goes along the lines of Refs. [4–6,10], which
show that A(t) is proportional to the difference of price
logarithms; here, we take log p(t+ 1) = log p(t) +A(t).
The threshold ǫi in Eq. (1) models the incentives of
agents for trading in the market. Some investors may
have incentives to trade because they need the market for
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exchanging goods or assets. This corresponds to ǫi < 0.
On the contrary, speculators who only trade for profiting
of price fluctuations typically have ǫi > 0. Of course
there may be prudent investors with ǫi > 0 or risk-lover
speculators with ǫi < 0 and a whole range of other type
of traders. Here we focus, for simplicity, on the case
ǫi = ǫ for i ≤ Ns
ǫi = −∞ for Ns < i ≤ N
The Np = N −Ns agents who have ǫi = −∞ — we call
them producers after Refs. [13,14] — trade no matter
what, whereas the remaining Ns — the speculators —
trade only if the cumulated performance of their active
strategy increases more rapidly than ǫt.
If the conditional time average 〈A|µ〉 of A(t) given
µ(t) = µ is non-zero, then the knowledge of µ(t) allows
a statistical prediction of the sign of A(t). A measure of
predictability is hence given by
H0 = 〈A〉2 = 1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2
where we introduced the notation (. . .) for averages over
µ (〈. . .〉 denotes averages on the stationary state). When
H0 = 0 the market is unpredictable or informationally
efficient. Volatility is instead defined as σ2 = 〈A2〉 and
it measures market’s fluctuations. A further quantity
of interest is the number Nact(t) =
∑
i〈φi(t)〉 of active
speculators in the market.
Exact results can be obtained in the thermodynamic
limit, which is defined as the limit Ns, Np, P →∞, keep-
ing constant the reduced number of speculators and pro-
ducers ns = Ns/P , np = Np/P . In this limit, both σ
2
and H0 diverge with the system size, since A(t) ∼
√
N .
Hence we shall consider the rescaled quantities H0/P or
σ2/P . A detailed account of the calculation will be given
elsewhere [15]. Here we just discuss the main step and the
results. Following Ref. [16], we derive an Ito stochastic
differential equations for the strategy scores yi(τ) = Ui(t)
in the rescaled continuous time τ = t/N
dyi
dτ
= −ai〈A〉y − ǫ+ ηi. (4)
Here ηi is a zero average Gaussian noise term with
〈ηi(τ)ηj(τ ′)〉 = 1
N
aiaj〈A2〉yδ(τ − τ ′). (5)
In Eqs. (4,5) averages 〈. . .〉y are taken on the distribution
of φi(t) in Eq. (3), which depends on yi(τ) in a non-
linear way: Prob{φi(t) = 1} = 1/[1 + eΓyi(τ)]. Hence
Eq. (4) is a quite complex system of non-linear equations
with a noise strength proportional to the time dependent
volatility 〈A2〉y. This feedback will be responsible for the
emergence of volatility build-ups.
Following Refs. [17,16] we find that the fraction 〈φi〉
of times that agent i plays his active strategy in the sta-
tionary state is the solution of the minimization of the
function
Hǫ =
1
P
P∑
µ=1

 N∑
i=1
〈φi〉aµi +
Ns+Np∑
i=Ns+1
aµi


2
+ 2ǫ
∑
i
〈φi〉 (6)
with respect to 〈φi〉. Note that for ǫ = 0 this function re-
duces to the predictability H0. For ǫ 6= 0, the solution to
this problem, and hence the stationary state, is unique.
An exact statistical mechanics description of the solution
{〈φi〉} can be carried out with the replica method, be-
cause the replica symmetric ansatz is exact. Furthermore
the solution to the Fokker-Planck equation correspond-
ing to Eq. (4) can be well approximated by a factorized
ansatz for ǫ 6= 0. This means that the off-diagonal cor-
relations vanish [〈(φi − 〈φi〉)(φj − 〈φj〉)〉 = 0 for i 6= j]
and, as a consequence, the volatility turns out to be given
by σ2 = 〈A2〉 = H0 +
∑Ns
i=1〈φi〉(1 − 〈φi〉). The solution
{〈φi〉} of the minimization of Hǫ provides a complete de-
scription of the model in the limit N →∞ for ǫ > 0. In
particular the behavior is independent of Γ.
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FIG. 1. Theory and numerical simulations: nact (top) and
σ2/P and H/P (bottom) as a function of ns for ǫ = 0.1
(solid line) and ǫ = −0.01 (dashed line). Numerical results
for ǫ = 0.1 (open symbols) and ǫ = −0.01 (full symbols) are
averages over 200 runs, with NsP = 10000 fixed and Γ =∞.
Fig. 1 shows that all these conclusions are perfectly
supported by numerical simulations: With a fixed num-
ber np of producers, as the number ns of speculators
increases, the market becomes more and more unpre-
dictable, i.e. H0 decreases. At the same time also the
volatility σ2 decreases. In a market with few speculators
(ns < 1 in Fig. 1), most of the fluctuations in A(t) are
due to the random choice of µ(t) (i.e. σ2 ≃ H0) and the
number nact of active speculators grows approximately
linearly with ns.
When ns increases further, the market reaches a point
where it is barely predictable. Then, for ǫ > 0 the num-
ber of active traders decreases and finally converges to
2
a constant. This means that the market becomes highly
selective: Only a negligible fraction of speculators trade
(φi(t) = 1) whereas the majority is inactive (φi(t) = 0).
The volatility σ2 also remains constant in this limit.
For ǫ < 0 we see a markedly different behavior: The
number of active speculators continues growing with ns
even if the market is unpredictableH0 ≈ 0. The volatility
σ2 has a minimum and then it increases with ns in a
way which depends on Γ. In other words, ǫ = 0 for
ns ≥ n⋆s(np) (= 4.15 . . . for np = 1) is the locus of a first
order phase transition across which Nact and σ
2 exhibit a
discontinuity. This same picture applies to a wider range
of GCMG models such as that of Ref. [6].
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FIG. 2. Probability distribution of A(t) > 0 for
ns = 10 (continuous line), 20,50,100,200 (dash-dotted line)
(PNs = 16000, np = 1, ǫ = 0.01, Γ = ∞). Inset: time se-
ries of returns A(t) showing volatility clustering for ns = 20
(lower curve), but not for ns = 200 (upper curve).
Numerical simulations reproduce anomalous fluctua-
tions similar to those of real financial markets close to
the phase transition line. As shown in Fig. 2, the distri-
bution of A(t) is Gaussian for small enough ns, and has
fatter and fatter tails as ns increases; the same behavior
is seen for decreasing ǫ. In particular the distribution
of A(t) shows a power law behavior P (|A| > x) ∼ x−β
with an exponent which we estimated as β ≃ 2.8, 1.4
for ns = 20, 200 respectively and ǫ = 0.01. Note that a
realistic value β ≈ 3 [19] is obtained for ns = 20.
This is inconsistent, at first sight, with the theoret-
ical results discussed previously for N → ∞. Indeed,
if the distribution of φi factorizes, A(t) is the sum of
Ns independent contributions and it satisfies the Central
Limit Theorem. This implies that for ǫ 6= 0 the variable
A(t)/
√
N converges in distribution to a Gaussian vari-
able with zero average and variance σ2/N in the limit
N → ∞. There are no anomalous fluctuations and no
stylized facts. Fig. 3 indeed shows that the anomalous
fluctuations of Fig. 2 are finite size effects which dis-
appear abruptly as the system size increases (or if Γ is
small).
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FIG. 3. Kurtosis of A(t) in simulations with ǫ = 0.01,
ns = 70, np = 1 and several different system sizes P for
Γ = 1, 10 and ∞.
In order to understand these finite size effects, we
note that volatility clustering arises because the noise
strength in Eqs. (4,5) is proportional to the time de-
pendent volatility 〈A2〉y. The noise term is a source of
correlated fluctuations because aiaj〈A2〉y/N ∼ 1/
√
N is
small but non zero, for i 6= j. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the dynamics will sustain collective correlated
fluctuations in the yi only if the correlated noise is larger
than the signal−ai
〈
A
〉
y
−ǫ which agents receive form the
deterministic part of Eq. (4). Time dependent volatil-
ity fluctuations would be dissipated by the deterministic
dynamics otherwise. A quantitative translation of this
insight goes as follows: The noise correlation term is of
order aiaj〈A2〉y/N ∼ σ2/P 3/2 for i 6= j. This should be
compared to the square of the deterministic term of Eq.
(4) [ai〈A〉y + ǫ]2 ∼
[√
H0/P + ǫ
]2
. Rearranging terms,
we find that volatility clustering sets in when
H0
σ2
+ 2ǫ
√
H0
P
P
σ2
+ ǫ2
P
σ2
≃ K√
P
(7)
where K is a constant. This prediction is remarkably
well confirmed by Fig. 4: In the lower panel we plot the
two sides of Eq. (7) as a function of ns, for different
system sizes. The upper panel shows that the volatility
σ2/N starts deviating from the analytic result exactly
at the crossing point ncs(P ) where Eq. (7) holds true.
Furthermore the inset shows that the region ns > n
c
s(P )
is described by a novel type of scaling limit. Indeed the
curves of Fig. 4 collapse one on top of the other when
plotted against ns/n
c
s(P ).
The non-linearity of the response of agents is crucial
for the onset of volatility time dependence. If Γ is small
the response becomes smooth and anomalous fluctua-
tions disappear (see Fig. 3). This picture is not affected
by the introduction of a finite memory in the learning
process of agents, as e.g. in Ref. [18]. In particular the
exponents of Fig. 2 do not depend on the memory.
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FIG. 4. Onset of the anomalous dynamics for different sys-
tem sizes. Top: σ2/N for different series of simulations with
L ≡ PNs constant: PNs = 1000 (circles), 2000 (squares),
4000 (diamonds), 8000 (up triangles) and 16000 (left trian-
gles). In all simulations np = 1, ǫ = 0.1 and Γ = ∞. Bot-
tom: L.H.S. of Eq. (7) (full line) from the exact solution and
K/
√
P = K(ns/L)
1/4 (parallel dashed lines) as a function of
ns (K ≃ 1.1132 in this plot). The intersection defines ncs(P ).
Inset: Collapse plot of σ2/N as a function of ns/n
c
s(P ).
The fact that, in finite systems, stylized facts arise
only close to the phase transition is reminiscent of fi-
nite size scaling in the theory of critical phenomena: In
d-dimensional Ising model, for example, at temperature
T = Tc + ε critical fluctuations (e.g. in the magnetiza-
tion) occur as long as the system size N is smaller than
the correlation volume ∼ ε−dν. But for N ≫ ε−dν the
system shows the normal fluctuations of a paramagnet.
Eq. (7) and H0/P ∼ ǫ2 imply that the same occurs in
the GCMG with dν = 4. In other words, the critical win-
dow shrinks as N−1/4 when N → ∞. However, because
of the long range nature of the interaction, anomalous
fluctuations either concern the whole system or do not
affect it at all, as clearly shown in Fig. 3. In the critical
region the Gaussian phase coexists probabilistically with
a phase characterized by anomalous fluctuations. This
and the discontinuous nature of the transition at ǫ = 0,
are usually typical of first order phase transitions.
The picture of a phase transition controlled by the sig-
nal to noise ratio appears to be universal for Minority
Games. Finite size effects close to the phase transition
of the standard MG [7,15] are indeed explained by the
same generic argument: When the signal to noise ratio
H0/σ
2 is of order 1/
√
P self-sustained collective fluctua-
tions arise.
Volatility clustering in real markets is known to be due
to wild fluctuations in the volume of trades [19]. Volume
is the number of active traders Nact+Np in the GCMG.
Hence wild volume fluctuations require correlated collec-
tive fluctuations in the behavior of agents which only
arise close to criticality. This suggests that real markets
operate close to a phase transition. Numerical simula-
tions suggest that exponents vary continuously on the
line of critical points. This raises the question of why
real markets self-organize close to the critical surface with
α ≈ 3.
We conclude that the GCMG exhibits a quite pecu-
liar type of phase transition which mixes properties of
continuous and discontinuous transitions. Finite size ef-
fects clearly relate the occurrence of stylized facts to
the analytic nature of the phase transition. The exten-
sion of renormalization group approaches to this system
promises to be a quite interesting challenge.
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